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With the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, the dispute 
settlement mechanism for international trade was greatly prepared unlike the 
old GATT system. It has a very different pattern from that of original GATT 
system. In our case, international trade is a matter of the future of nations, 
and in reality of the intense world economic competition, this system change 
may well be of concern to our government or legal experts. In this context, 
this paper examines the nature and problems of the WTO appeal system un-
der the premise of the rule of law, judicial prowess, and the role of a judge. 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is based on the domestic judicial 
system or other international judicial systems. In contrast to this, the com-
parative history is only short indeed, but according to the accumulation of 
future precedents, it is highly possible to provide a model for the achievement 
of the rule of law ideals in the international community. However, due to the 
inherent limitations of international agreement system, the reality of appel-
late body is not easy. In terms of the international trade and rule of law, the 
role of appellate body and judges is very broad. However, in this paper, we 
first look at the significance and nature of the launch of WTO and further-
more; 1) the rule of law and judicial system, 2) several issues related to the 
nature of WTO dispute settlement mechanism, 3) the importance of 
judge-made law and the scope and limitations of appellate jurisdiction, 4) issues 
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of reference materials submitted by procedures outside the process, 5) the re-
lationship between the appellate body and political authorities. Over the re-
view, the penetrating thoughts will be focused on judicial activism. Those 
points of consideration will be discussed through the approach and method 
on the comparative legal studies and several significant WTO precedents. 
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1. Introduction 
Unlike the old GATT system, the dispute settlement procedure of World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter referred to as WTO) was extensively revised in 1995 
with the launch of new framework. It is very different from the old system, to il-
lustrate, the adoption of reverse consensus system, specification of time limit on 
procedure, and establishment of appellate body (hereinafter referred to as AB), 
which aims to envision the rule of law in international trade regime. For the 
state actors, international trade often would be a problem of the keen national 
interest. In fact, the world gradually is becoming to be competitive surrounding 
the trade interest, in which the paradigm change is a concern of government or 
legal experts. In this context, this paper illuminates and examines the nature or 
problems of WTO framework under the thesis of rule of law, judicial activism, 
and role of judge. Unlike the domestic judiciary or other international judicial 
systems, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has a relatively short history. 
Nevertheless, with the rapid evolution with accumulation of precedents, it is 
likely to provide a model for achieving the rule of law in the international com-
munity. However, due to inherent limitations of the international treaty system, 
challenges faced by the panel or appellate body are never nugatory. In this paper, 
we first examine the significance or nature within the establishment of WTO, 
and then examine the judicial face of WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Over 
chapters, we will discuss related topics concerned with the nature of judge-made 
law, scope and limitations of appellate jurisdiction, issues of reference materials 
submitted by the actors outside the procedure, relationship between the appel-
late body and political organs, as well as judicial activism. 
2. Background 
The history of mankind can be viewed from various perspectives even if we are 
ignorant of propositions or theories from historians. It may be a history of war 
and conquest as well as a society that is improved by the power of human intel-
ligence and freedom. It also may be a historical necessity that develops according 
to the conflict between the relations of economic production and labor or prod-
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many will be indulged to illustrate the first and second world wars. As the war 
ended with the victory of allies, major world powers responded to the demand of 
international community for peace, thus creating the United Nations as a politi-
cal entity and the system on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (he-
reinafter referred to as GATT) for international trade. It is a well-known fact 
that the GATT system was launched in 1947 instead of the International Trade 
Organization (ITO), which was originally conceived by the powers as a principal 
management authority for the real sector of world economy in parallel with the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) and IBRD (International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development). From this point of view, human history is neither 
necessarily a history of war and conquest nor is a historically inevitable process 
in accordance with the contradictions of production relations and labor forces as 
prophecies of genius economist. I think that the history is not so wrong if it is 
being improved through a positive function of human reason and freedom even 
under the ideology or dogmatic form of theory. 1947 GATT system has func-
tioned as a management system concerning the international trade for a long 
time, and in 1986, the GATT became transferred to a new frame of WTO-extended 
and deepened creature to manage the world trade-as a result of seven years mul-
tilateral negotiation, so-called Uruguay Round (Dam, 1970; Carr & Stone, 2017; 
Bethlehem, McRae, Neufeld, & Van Damme, 2009; Seo, 2001; Lee, 1999a). 
The WTO does not presuppose a complicated logical analysis. However, it is 
in same sense as a resurgence of the International Trade Organization at the 
trade station, which had once been the ideal of mankind in the past. If we un-
derstand the important characteristics of global community in view of political 
economic phenomenon, we can see that humanity is integrated politically and 
economically through such ideal organization of United Nations and World 
Trade Organization. There can we suggest the critical viewpoints to this ideal 
system from several perspectives. First, some scholars reduce the meaning of 
United Nations and World Trade Organization in terms of international politi-
cal realism. Second, others may hold a view to pay attention to the phenomenon 
of localization or globalization of the world in opposition to a unification theory 
of international society. In other words, such camp of thought criticizes the 
idealism for global economic integration based on the critical importance of re-
gion for economic cooperation or integration, or the glocalization hypothesis for 
political and cultural specificity. Third, there is a reformist position to achieve 
idealistic integration by collecting the wisdom of mankind while improving the 
current system of United Nations and WTO. These views are not pure idealism 
in that they accept the political and economic reality of international communi-
ty. 
What do the United Nations and World Trade Organization, representing the 
ideals of mankind, cast implications in terms of human integration? What about 
the future of such an organization in the political and economic reality with a 
sharp confrontation of interests among nations? In this article, I would like to 
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attached with the global economy (Auby, 2003). At the beginning of political 
economics, what we learn is that the reality of economy is not to work in accor-
dance with pure market principles. A liberal regime and market principle are 
theories and principles that support the development of modern civil society and 
democracy, but the failure of domestic and global market pertaining the interna-
tional trade are the reality that we all must accept (Lee, 1999b). The failure of 
market inevitably leads to regulation, domestic regulation of the economy, in-
ternational regulation, and regime of trade management (1999). In 1947, the 
GATT system was lacking in many ways. To complement this, the WTO system 
was launched at the end of negotiation over a long period of seven years. In 
ideal, no one will hesitate to take it as the kind of “democratization of the 
economy” and “establishment of the rule of law in international trade”, which 
triggers the transformation of systems into a multilateralist system. In other 
words, the new start with WTO is revolutionary in that it is a system to over-
come an alienation phenomenon, say, anti-discrimination within the interna-
tional trade system, including the unreasonable economic pressure and gray-area 
measures that persisted in the past. 
One of great features in the WTO system is the efficiency and strengthening 
of dispute settlement procedure (Lee, 1999a). This can be said that the WTO 
system generally would be any most successful paradigm having realized the rule 
of law within the arena of international trade. The history of mankind demon-
strates that the trajectory to integrate subjects into a system politically and eco-
nomically begins from the stage of political inclusion through economic integra-
tion (Auby, 2003). 
Of course, the order may differ or comes inverse. In the case of United States 
(hereinafter referred to as US), integration was achieved through political inde-
pendence waging a bitter war and by the enactment of federal constitution. One 
of the most important provisions concerning incorporation of sovereign states 
into a unitary national framework would be called upon so-called Commerce 
Clause. By virtue of constitutional validation for the role of Congress under the 
interstate commerce requirements, the United States achieved a national inte-
gration with a free flow of commerce, in which the commerce clause functions as 
the legal ground to justify an exercise of congressional power, to say, with re-
spect to the constitutional power of federal government. Europe is no exception. 
An integration of European Union (hereinafter referred to as EU) began with 
the abolition of tariffs among the countries of region and led to a high level of 
economic integration including the common trade policies and currencies as 
well as pursuit of political integration through the enactment of European Con-
stitution. It generally is undisputable that it plays a crucial role for the economy 
to be systemized in terms of integration and discrimination. Therefore, if the 
WTO system harmonizes trade conflicts among nations and resolves them in 
accordance with the doctrines that can be firmly accepted by all, it is possible to 
achieve economic globalization of the world. An emerging unitary economic 
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The Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter referred to as DSB) within WTO is 
described in that the rule of law within the world trade regime, what is referred 
to as predictability and legal stability, will be an ultimate goal with the estab-
lishment of two tier judicial review, say, panels and appellate bodies. In this 
context, I would like to raise the following questions. First, what are the nature 
of rule of law and the role of judicial organs? Second and more specifically, what 
is the judicial role of WTO Panel or Appellate Body with respect to the rule of 
law, and is the current WTO framework functioning properly? Although this 
problem can be approached from various perspectives and requires a thorough 
discussion of the law and philosophy, this paper focuses on the problems of the 
WTO’s appellate body, as well as some examples of comparative law and histor-
ical perspectives. For the convenience of understanding, it needs to be remarked 
that the WTO dispute settlement system differs from national judiciary orga-
nized under the framework of domestic enabling statute since it is instituted to 
serve the purpose of international organizations. Second, as predicated upon the 
tradition of long-standing international arbitration and its conventional influ-
ence, we will survey the arguably triptychs of elementary features, i.e. judicial re-
view pursuant to the rule of law, independence of WTO judicial organs, and the 
supremacy of judiciary1. More specifically, the paper will deal with the impor-
tance of judge-made law through a recent development of WTO in terms of 
dispute resolution, debate on the extent of appellate body’s judicial scope, the 
institutional nature of appellate body, its relationship with political institutions, 
and the judicial activism advocated by international pressure group or progres-
sivists. Let’s briefly review the proposition. 
3. Rule of Law and Justice System in the WTO Dispute  
Resolution 
The World Trade Organization is making efforts to secure the rule of law at the 
global level in international trade (Auby, 2003). If so, what is the rule of law, and 
what does it do for man and society? In principle, the rule of law is an ideology 
to prevent arbitrary domination of human beings and to realize the ideal of li-
berty and equal protection. Through the rule of law, human beings can secure 
predictability and legal stability in society and are protected from intervention 
against a legitimate trust. The rule of law has been aided by the development of 
modern civil society and liberal democracy. The main principles include the su-
premacy of constitution or parliamentary government, legitimacy of public 
power on executive and judiciary, as well as judicial review on administration. 
This kind of core principles enshrined with the rule of law has been transformed 
 
 
1Kermit L. Hall, Unpublished lecture note. Utah State University: In the lecture, Professor Hall 
claims that the US Supreme Court has over 200 years of judicial review, judicial independence, and 
judicial sovereignty. This opposing claim may be a part of the value relating with the judicial system 
of United States but reflects closely the reality of WTO as affected from the US legal traditions or po-
litical economy. Not only is its impact considerable, but the recent development of Europe, as exem-
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from modern formal legalism to substantive rule of law. It is noteworthy that the 
rule of law plays as the axis of support for democracy by institutionalizing a do-
mination of the majority through ensuring the democratic constitutionalism. By 
virtue of democratic constitutionalism, the government protects the legitimate 
rights and interests of minority from unjustifiable tyrannies (Kim, 2002). In or-
der to realize the rule of law in international trade, it is necessary to accept the 
universal kind of global multilateralism and to reconsider existing gray-area 
measures through various agreements and judicial institutions in the end to li-
beralize trade. This means that the WTO guarantees predictability. In this direc-
tion, it had undergone a plethora of changes with a new deal, which sharply de-
parted from the GATT, prior regime as vulnerable on political and diplomatic 
character. 
In other words, the majority of countries in the world become members of 
WTO, resulting in the possibility of undemocratic containment by so-called bi-
lateral practices and unilateral trade pressure. There has also been a revolutio-
nary strengthening of the judicial review system to defend the principles of trade 
liberalization and fair competition. The dispute settlement understanding was 
adopted to systemize the dispute settlement procedures, to improve the efficien-
cy of proceedings, and to establish the appellate body ensuring uniformity in the 
interpretation of WTO laws. The WTO also adopted a reverse consensus system 
to promote the rule of law ideal and enhanced judicialization of the dispute set-
tlement mechanism. A unanimous mode of consensus practiced by GATT pre-
ferred a political and diplomatic governance over the dispute settlement proce-
dure, in which it would be considered valid if the decisions of the Panel and Ap-
pellate Body were not rejected by the entire member states. Although there may 
be a controversy concerning the interpretation of Article 16 within the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (herei-
nafter referred to as DSU), the decision of the panel and appellate body shall 
take effect immediately because at least the prevailing party would not veto and 
it is unimaginable for the whole of more than 140 members to deny it. In doing 
so, it introduced an unprecedented historical decision-making system that 
would enable the WTO to achieve an ideal universally embedded on the rule of 
law through panels and appellate bodies, while at the same time guaranteeing the 
political character of organization so that it should remain as an international 
organization with sovereign countries. 
What features of the WTO framework are there in comparison with the rule 
of law in a sovereign state with respect to securing a formal and substantive le-
galism? First, it lacks the supreme law2 to overwhelm the individual member 
 
 
2In the case of claiming the supremacy of international law with respect to the relationship of hie-
rarchy between domestic and international laws, such as Kelsen, there may exist the supreme law in 
the international society from an idealistic point of view. J. Peter Pham, The Perils of Consensus: 
Hans Kelsen and the Legal Philosophy of the United Nations, 14 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 553; The 
existence of supreme law is deemed as a last safeguard against the arbitrary political majority, which 
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state, say, the kind of highest legislation to preempt the will or constitutions of 
member states. The WTO system consists with the multilateral treaties and is 
expected to practice as an international organization, while the treaties are 
created by the member states on equal shoulder and non-hierarchically. They 
function as the ultimate source of WTO law, in which the member states are a 
norm giver and norm receiver simultaneously. In other words, major agreements 
such as the agreement establishing the WTO, the agreements on trade in goods, 
and GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) or TRIPS (Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) are merely treaties concluded between 
member states in terms of legal theory. Although the global states maintain dif-
fering attitudes regarding the validity of treaty and its status within the domestic 
legal system, they often deny the effect of treaty laws when conflict arises as con-
tradictory to the Constitution. This means that that the WTO regime does not 
qualify to exercise a hierarchical power over the member states as dissimilar to 
the domestic legal system. In fact, it goes desultory in strict sense of legal process 
notwithstanding a retaliation or dismemberment, in case that the states do not 
voluntarily respect the treaties, lacking the kind of state power over person in the 
constitutional government. There may be no direct alternative if the major 
member states, in particular the United States or European Union, deny WTO 
agreements or ignore the decisions of the dispute settlement body on the basis of 
their highest law3. The EU and European states are relatively good peers because 
their tradition comparatively tends to comply with the respect of international 
treaties and has a positive view of the WTO system. Otherwise, chances are not 
negligible to encounter, “if you are against my own national interests, I may de-
rogate, based on our own highest law as well as the rule of law ideal envisaged 
with the launch of WTO”. 
Second, even under the formal rule of law, it is made distinct from the domes-
tic rule of law owing to the difficulty and procrastination of legislation (Charno-
vitz, 2003). The WTO system is based on multilateral agreements, for instance, 
the establishment agreement or trade agreement on goods. In the case of indi-
 
 
3The existence of the supreme law and the supremacy of constitution are supported by the majority 
of constitutional scholars in Korea. In some cases, the decision of the WTO dispute settlement body 
may not be respected in Korea. Then WTO sanctions merely would be the approval of retaliatory 
measures and there is no mechanism to enforce the decision itself. Therefore, the supremacy of su-
pranational bodies and UN Charter would not be realistically implemented in the secular terms, and 
thus it is generally recognized that there is a lack of supreme law or justice in the international 
community. For instance, the Byrd act was found to violate the WTO agreement, but the US Su-
preme Court upheld it was constitutional. In the case of EU, there is also a debate on the contradic-
tion between the decisions of European Court of Justice and WTO dispute settlement body. A con-
tradiction concerning ideals and reality for the supremacy of international law or the unitary inter-
national legal system does exist by any means. Jost Delbruck, Prospects for a World (Internal) Law: 
Legal Developments in a Changing International System, 9 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 401; Retaliation 
as regards trade issues can be a very effective measure to sanction, and phenomena, such as the trade 
war, that had been intense to bring a struggle over Calvo provisions in the past are unlikely to occur 
within modern international law regimes. However, as in the case of Korea, it has a limitation that 
the international law cannot directly nullify or revoke the domestic measures, and it can be distin-
guished from the domestic legal system on the supreme law, common ideals of politics and various 
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vidual member state, it is possible to make a necessary legislation promptly 
based on the principle of majority rule in the parliament and on the basis of 
common interests privileged with a cultural homogeneity. Not only because the 
possibly opposite side of understanding among negotiating parties gets it more 
complicated, but also because the amendment of treaty requires a multilayered 
process of law creation, the legislative response may be delayed. Of course, there 
is a certain level of common recognition among the countries in the internation-
al trade, and there are aspects that can be complemented by the negotiation 
technique developed for solving international problems. Therefore, an important 
axis inherent in the rule of law, which underwrites the priority of parliamentary 
legislation, can be an obstacle due to the difficulties or procrastination of revis-
ing the WTO Agreement. From the viewpoint concerning the rule of law, the 
current WTO system can be said to be relatively functional in terms of the judi-
cial control or normative hierarchy to the end of ensuring a legitimacy for trade 
administration. However, from the viewpoint of lacking highest law as a lyn-
chpin against being possibly desultory or in terms of often delayed legislation 
leading to the paralyzed formal rule of law, it is a system with disabilities. And 
these obstacles are inevitable due to inherent limitations within the WTO system 
as an international organization. Therefore, the rule of law under the WTO or-
ganization seems to be effective in the present stage by virtue of securing through a 
quasi-legislative role of judges concerning so-called judge-made law (Guerin, 
2005; Beilin, 2003). The importance of judge-made law under the WTO gover-
nance4 increasingly became more urgent in the following points. 
First, it is no exaggeration to state that the WTO system is being supported by 
the United States and European Union. In this reality, it can be effective to de-
velop firmly an established rule that can be accepted by everyone in the interna-
tional society through judge-made law by putting on specific cases of disputes 
rather than asserting a tremendous organizational reform. Organizational reform 
is at stake in the present stage. Instead, a rite law or paleo-verity on plain state-
ment from the panel or appellate body may strand to enhance the rule of law 
and speak of the proper role of panels or judges. Second, the importance of 
judge-made law has traditionally played an important role in realizing an au-
thentic service of the rule of law. It secures concrete validity and justice from the 
majority rule on the idea of parliamentarism and makes a great contribution to 
protecting the interests of just minorities. Institutionally, through the interpreta-
tion of constitutional law, for instance, judicial review or constitutionality re-
view, the judiciary guarantees concrete and verifiable definition, protects system, 
guarantees principle of fair competition in society, and protects individual free-
dom. Currently, the WTO is operating on the basis of the dispute settlement 
understanding with respect to several substantive legal treaties and dispute reso-
lution procedures, including the establishment agreement. Therefore, as a judge 
 
 
4The statutory language is as follows: The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal 
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in the case at bar, it is more likely to experience legislative vacuum or flaws than 
a domestic judge. For this reason, it is necessary to supplement the law by judge. 
Of course, the question of control as an arbitrator will remain. Third, in the 
realm of international trade and trade administration, two sources of norm con-
ventionally have played as an important governing law, i.e. the practice of mer-
chant society and precedents that had been developed since GATT. Over history, 
the British and American laws have been dominant in this area of law, and the 
tradition of diplomacy and treaty laws from the continent has been a major axis. 
Therefore, the composition of panel or appellate judiciary, judicial activities, 
philosophy, as well as legal theory and practice they espouse, are in fact the kind 
of critical intersection between the US and continental laws. In other words, in 
view of the overwhelming influence from US and EU, the legal system supported 
by two major powers will have a considerable influence. This view also pertains 
to the role of judicial decision makers in the WTO. Therefore, it is necessary to 
protect an ideology latent within the trade justice through the active role of 
WTO judicial organs although we face with the reality that it is bound to have 
limitations as an international organization. With respect to the principle of 
predictability, legal stability and certainty, there is a strong need for vigilant sur-
veillance and control over arbitrariness or abusive practice utilizing the refined 
system of dispute settlement body.  
4. WTO Appellate Body as Marbury V. Madison’s Reprint? 
The WTO Panel, as well as the Appellate Body, may function as a judicial organ 
in its original functioning, which may impose a challenge for the wholesale act. 
Although the appellate body has always emphasized its role and power as a typi-
cal judicial organ in resolving disputes, it has the character of being subordinate 
to the dispute settlement body or the ministerial council. The possibility of 
maintaining a judicial character similar to domestic courts requires a lot of re-
view provided that the WTO panel or AB functions under the circumstances un-
likened to the national judiciary. The issue of jurisdictional question for each 
sort of courts, as we see, is determined in most cases as based on the supreme 
law of nation and related statutes in an individual country. A little in variance, it 
is not only peculiar, but also profound in influence over global constitutional 
rule that it has been solved through the precedent of judiciary itself as we see in 
Marbury v. Madison5. The WTO Appellate Body also seems to be in a situation 
to benchmark the lesson of 18th US courts in 21st century. However, in the case 
of WTO disputes concerning international trade, the nature of agenda is not as 
simple as the judicial review on constitutionality, so that we see a peril if the 
WTO panel or appellate body may be disposed to the inconsistent practice 
should it rely on the precedents of appellate body without criticism, i.e. usurps to 
adjudicate non-justiciable case or too much actively exercises jurisdiction to ob-
tain the common terms of justice. 
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In other words, there are complications related to systemic flaws or advantag-
es over the dispute settlement mechanism, such as uncertainty of jurisdictional 
scope, possibility of usurping the domestic jurisdiction as traversal, virtue of ac-
tive judicial justice, and challenge to ensure the predictability of jurisdictions for 
appellate body. If the statutory ground for judicial authority of the WTO stems 
from DSU6, which, however, should not contravene the WTO establishing agree-
ment, the agreement, in fact, shall have the same effect as a higher law against 
DSU. The DSU has only the principled provisions on the matters of authority for 
the panel or appellate body, so that it is often necessary to supplement by inter-
preting the relevant law. To simplify the problem, the WTO jurisdiction is ame-
nable to a triad of classifications as, first, “what it can do”, second, “what it 
should do”, and third, what should not be done. With respect to the first catego-
ry, DSU provides that the Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the le-
gal findings or conclusions of Panel7 and, if the implementation of DSB’s rec-
ommendations and rulings is not fully complied with, it can suggest ways in 
which the members concerned implement the recommendations8. The second 
category includes an obligation to keep under the recommendations and rules of 
DSU as well as surveil their implementation. The obligation to make up for the 
DSB working procedures in consultation with the chairman of DSB and the Sec-
retary General also falls within the category as “what it should do”. Other obliga-
tions pertaining to the second would underlie conducting appellate review for 
the panel’s report including the findings and conclusions, suggesting ways to 
implement as a replacement, keeping confidential the documents submitted by 
the parties or third parties, as well as ensuring the opportunity to submit written 
and oral comments by the third party. Lastly and relating the third category of 
“what should not be done”, it is necessary to forebear from ex-parte communi-
cation through the dispute settlement process and to avoid expanding or reduc-
ing the rights and duties under the covered agreement. DSU also forbids ad-
judging cases that are likely to arise in conflict of interest. Adjudication on issues 
raised lately on the AB proceedings is impermissible because it comes beyond 
the scope of jurisdictions and powers of the appellate body. 
DSU is neither explicit to enumerate nor conceptually comprehensive to de-
fine the scope of powers vested within the appellate body. However, due to the 
inherent nature of jurisdictional question, it is necessary to exercise judicial 
power even if the statutory ground to confer the jurisdiction with DSU is lack-
 
 
6A former WTO Director-General characterized the WTO dispute settlement system as “the most 
active international adjudicative mechanism in the world today”. Chad P. Bown of the Peterson In-
stitute for International Economics and Petros Mavroidis remarked on the 20th anniversary of the 
dispute settlement system that the system is “going strong” and that “there is no sign of weakening”. 
7The statutory language is as follows: The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal 
findings and conclusions of the panel. DSU 17.13. 
8DSU 19.1 consists of two statements. In the preceding sentence, it describes the recommendations 
of the post-hearing panel and the implementation measures of appellate body. In the latter sentence, 
together with the recommendations, it provides for specific measures to implement the findings or 
recommendations as follows, “In addition to its recommendations, the panel or the Applicant Body 
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ing. As exemplary, DSU guarantees the right of third party joinder, but comes to 
be silent in respect of its specific scope. For this reason, a plethora of precedents 
prove that it might contravene the requirements of adversary system by allowing 
the impermissibly wider chances of third party intervention (implying if DSU is 
often more involved than the parties).  
Under the circumstances where the WTO has no choice but to ensure the in-
terest of member states to fully claim their benefits and privileges because the 
organization is political or diplomatic in nature, the current system of third-party 
intervention seems hardly challengeable. However, with a grand scale reform, 
such as to adopt a reverse consensus system and rule of law framework, I think 
that a maintenance of wider third-party intervention likely comes incompatible 
with the founding cause of world trade organization in 1994. The appellate body 
may recourse to a number of substantive provisions in order to supplement the 
legislative deficiencies and to define the scope of jurisdiction and cure the ambi-
guities through precedent. The AB is prohibited from impermissible law-making 
because it should cohere with its character as an adjudicatory body. This for-
bearance also underlies the explicit provision of DSU that forbids to function as 
an undue legislative row. Therefore, it needs an enabling legal ground to create 
any jurisdictions on its own, as in the case of Marbury case. 
DSU 3.2 stipulates that the WTO, in interpreting its agreements or memo-
randum, is required to comply with the customs of international public law and 
shall refer to the Vienna convention on the law of treaties9. Furthermore, the 
memorandum is understood to impose the duty of Vienna convention on the 
judicial organs of WTO. It also stresses the importance of speedy trial as a duty 
of DSB10. The behind policy to command with DSB in resolving a dispute much 
relies on the principle of good faith or bona fide efforts to peacefully resolve the 
dispute11. It is, therefore, less on the kind of acidity inherent in the adversary 
system or judicial proceedings of national court. These provisions, in particular, 
DSU 3.2 and Vienna convention, afford the AB with the legal basis for a dynam-
ic and progressive settlement without a prejudice to the rights and duties of 
member states under covered agreements. 
If the selfdom of WTO appellate body on creation of jurisdictions is arbitrary 
and contentious, what will happen? As in Marbury for the United States Su-
preme Court, is it viewed to determinedly define the scope of jurisdiction with 
his own precedent as if susceptible of controversy? With respect to the rule of 
precedent and anti-majoritarian difficulty, can it be established and maintained 
through?  
First, the possibility may well be destroyed from an institutional point of view 
(Howse, 2003). To put, the establishing treaty of WTO and relating agreements 
exclusively bestowed the power to finalize a treaty interpretation on political or-
gans, such as ministerial conference or administrative bureau. Therefore, the 
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opinion of appellate body can be invalidated in the case if three fourth member 
states would agree as contrary to the precedent of jurisdictional determination12. 
Although the possibility is extremely slim that the legal interpretation of appel-
late body might be revoked, its authority is never final in terms of the logic and 
polemics within the WTO laws. 
Second, there is a possibility of disagreement by the parties in dispute. The 
decision of panel or appellate body must be accepted without a condition unless 
a unanimous consent is accorded to the contrary. At this time, as a last resort, 
waivers may be sought in accordance with the establishing agreement of WTO 
conceptually higher to DSU in terms of legal effect. A quorum for exemption is 
three-quarters of the member states’, but unanimity is needed according to the 
views of AB as mentioned above.  
Third, if the appellate body’s exercise of judgment on jurisdictional determi-
nation is inadequate, may disputing states bring an issue to the more general in-
ternational tribunal or try to obtain the advisory opinion of International Court 
of Justice (hereinafter referred to as ICJ). Since the ICJ can give an advisory opi-
nion exclusively to the specialized agencies of United Nations, there could be 
well-versed arguments to disagree. If the parties in dispute are contentious and 
the AB already made substantive decisions on the jurisdiction created on its own 
precedent, is it still possible to file a complaint with the ICJ claiming the illegal 
nature of jurisdictional self-creation. Separate perspective may stand. As op-
posed, the ICJ may not accept such a complaint because DSU provides for un-
conditional acceptance of the findings and recommendations made by AB. On 
the other hand, the ICJ can have a room to exercise adjudicating on the com-
plaint because the Statute of ICJ has provisions presumptive of the situation on 
this kind. For instance, the statute mandates its jurisdictional competence on the 
interpretation of treaty and the organizing agreement of international organiza-
tion. More specifically, in the event of a complaint on this kind, the Court is re-
quired to notify the relevant international organization of the complaint and to 
send a copy of the document13. These provisions would be a circumstantial evi-
dence to support the second view (Howse, 2003).  
5. The Appellate Body as a Judicial Organ: From the  
Arbitration Agency or International Trade Forum 
Unlike the GATT in the past, the World Trade Organization, as elaborated 
above, has largely embraced multilateralism and rule of law values for the reali-
zation of economic democracy. It is understood in this context that the appellate 
mechanism had been ordained in place as departs from the practice of GATT, 
but the nature of international arbitration still remains. Now that the WTO itself 
is not a legal entity on its own autonomy, but the kind of international organiza-
tion subsidiary to the member states, it is likely that the attitude of appellate 
 
 
12In a different viewpoint, the AB may, in fact, require a consensus or unanimous vote that follows 
the practice of GATT as a binding authority.  
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body will be an important variable in determining the degree of judicial charac-
terization within the system. In other words, due to the limited nature of WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism, we see a weakness against our judicial the-
sis—latent in the nature of judicial advisory board to DSB, panel members lean-
ing on arbitration or less on hard law concept, the lack of specific laws on dis-
pute settlement procedures, as well as the flaws without systemic mechanism as 
differs from the domestic law enforcement. For example, in relation to the pro-
cedure of appeal, the issue arises how much the appellate body may be advised 
from outside sources about the fact or evidence and concerning the extent to 
which a relevant fact or information can be received outside of procedure14. In 
other words, the critical questions need to be answered whether it can be used as 
a source of facts, including a written submission on matters from persons other 
than the state parties in order for the discovery of substantive truth. 
Only the state entity is exclusively qualified to become ae member of WTO 
besides a scanty exception, such as EU or some of separate customs territory like 
Hong Kong. On the other hand, the member states with a stake in the matter 
have the opportunity to participate in the proceedings as a third party and to 
argue by raising a defense or filing a claim. In such cases, individuals, public in-
terest associations, non-governmental organizations, i.e. other than the parties to 
covered agreements, as not attached to the panel dossiers or written submissions 
of the parties, may state by independently filing a written submission. In the ab-
sence of a request from the appellate body, therefore, it is a question of whether 
the AB can accept them if it is stated through such independent written submis-
sions on the matter, which likely would be an Amicus Curaie problem by the 
outsiders. In most cases of domestic civil proceedings, the principle of party au-
tonomy advises that the court hears within the scope of assertion by the parties 
and may penalize the procedure if the court deviates from such scope. In some 
cases, the court may ex officio investigate or determine its authority and, in oth-
er cases or under the principle of public knowledge, it can be possible to ac-
knowledge the fact without resorting to the court documents of parties (Beilin, 
2003). As noted above, however, the legal nature of WTO dispute disposes that it 
has to do with the public law of international trade. In this respect, it is more 
prospective to further strengthen the power ex office or positive exercise of ju-
risdictions as relates to the professionalism of panel procedure or the process of 
appellate body. In the case of Turtles (WT/DS58AB/R, 1998), the written state-
ment of non-governmental entity related to the investigation and examination of 
the panel and appellate body was a problem, and the panel concluded that DSU 
gave it the right to request a submission of relevant evidence15. The panel further 
opined that there is no right, therefore, for non-Members to submit non-requested 
 
 
14In principle, the appellate body can only hear about legal issues raised within the panel proceedings 
as well as the panel’s decision, but there is no clear yardstick to draw upon its jurisdiction in case 
where the appellate body applies the theory of “completing analysis”. 
15DSU 13.1 states that the panel may seek information or technical advice from an individual or or-
ganization which it deems appropriate; DSU 13.2 states that information may be obtained from re-
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arguments or documents to non-Members in view of absent language concern-
ing non-request. The appellate body has rejected the views of panel.  
In its rulings, the appellate body states that the panel should not narrowly in-
terpret the phrase “seek information” within the DSU, but rather interpret it 
more broadly in light of the basic purpose of evidence law or investigation pro-
cedure16, which pursues a full disclosure of objective truth and facts as pre-
scribed by the DSU. In addition, the principle of DSU requires a panel of faithful 
and objective assessment of the matter as described above and authorizes a pow-
er to create the specific rules of procedure17. The principle needs to be received 
broadly as to conceptualize the power to an objective assessment of the facts 
and to determine whether the act or inaction of parties violates the covered 
agreements. As a corollary, the panel’s power to request disclosure of informa-
tion is merely to prescribe some authority over the panel’s factual hearing in 
special cases so that the panel may invoke a reference from outside sources as 
aground to determine facts, and if the panel had not done so, the appellate 
body could accept such reference material at the appellate stage. In particular, 
since DSU is neither completely systematic nor detailed unlike the domestic 
civil procedure law or evidence law, the panel needs to exercise its powers in-
dispensably necessary to fulfill its obligations. In the case, the AB accepts three 
non-governmental submissions attached to the panel dossiers of member parties 
and one reference materials independently submitted by that non-governmental 
organization.  
Hereinafter, the AB opinion on the case will be briefly examined.  
First, according to DSU, AB can only hear about the legal issues raised and 
adjudicated in the panel procedure as well as the panel’s judgment18, and it does 
not appear that any clause in the working procedures or DSU expressly confers 
on the AB to request a disclosure of information. In spite of these problems, 
however, the appellate body reaffirmed its acceptance of reference materials in 
the Steel case (WT/DS138/AB/R, 2000). It illuminated that no provision of DSU 
or the code of practice on dispute settlement procedure stipulates the right to 
receive such reference materials. On the other hand, since it does not prohibit 
their acceptance, it could do so as necessary and in accordance with the provi-
sions of authorizing an enactment of AB procedural rules19, to the extent that it 
does not expressly violate the DSU and WTO agreements. If it is necessary in all 
 
 
16DSU 11 states that the role of the panel is to assist the dispute settlement body with regard to the 
DSU and the fulfillment of its obligations under the WTO Agreement. The dispute settlement body 
shall assist the parties to make appropriate recommendations and decisions. The panel shall consult 
regularly with the parties in dispute and shall provide them with an appropriate opportunity for 
mutually satisfactory resolution.  
17DSU 12.1 stipulates that the Panel shall comply with the rules of working practice in Annex 3, un-
less otherwise decided after consultation with the parties to the dispute. 
18The appeal is limited to the legal issues set forth in the panel report and the panel’s legal interpreta-
tion of the issue. DSU 17.6. 
19DSU 17.9 provides that the Appellate Body shall establish rules of working practice in consultation 
with the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body and the Secretary General and shall notify the 
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cases to invoke an express ground in order to establish the scope of jurisdictional 
competence for AB, we see it implausible with respect to practical considera-
tions—a plethora of provisions as possibly supplemented with the interpretive 
discretion of AB judges as well as a probably impotent AB without such supple-
mentary role of judges. In particular, the holdings of appellate body in Turtles 
were not based on the request for information disclosure under Article 13 of the 
DSU, but comprehensively considering the provisions stipulating the right of 
panel to enact such rules. Therefore, it is not appropriate to argue that the AB 
cannot accept such an amicus submission unless it is explicitly granted the right 
to disclose information. It should also be noted that the AB is able to conduct a 
factual investigation in certain cases and it can help to form the basis of adjudi-
cation if the reference material contains factual statements as well as legal opi-
nions. The AB opinion to define the status and authority on their own rationale 
is a last resort to selfdom. It can serve expanding its powers by using the right to 
enact rules on the panel or AB procedures in order to solve the problem in a 
number of cases where there is often insufficient evidence and flawed trial on the 
facts required in the panel procedure. 
Second, the right to participate in the dispute settlement procedure involving 
parties or third parties20 through a submission of reference materials has not 
been generally recognized since 1947 GATT and until the WTO was established 
in 1994. In other words, the GATT or WTO is dealing with the issue of the for-
mal nature of international trade, which is clearly limited by the provisions of 
WTO agreements21. However, the AB explicated that a language of WTO laws 
should be interpreted coherently of multifaceted intricacies within the express 
provisions and in light of the higher ideological command reflected on the WTO 
establishing agreement (hereinafter referred to as WTO Agreement). In other 
words, the member states should ensure that trade and trade policies are in 
place to improve the welfare of citizens, full employment, stable growth of real 
income, creation of effective demand, expansion of rights to trade within the 
system and comprehensively the benefits or interests of member states22. In 
this context, the critique outrightly can be skeptic as conservative to see that 
only member states are eligible to make a written submission within the pro-
cedure where environmental or health issues increasingly roar as a serious 
trade issue.  
Third, the proactive stance of AB on the acceptance of reference materials can 
be criticized in terms of confidentiality or adversary system. However, it seems 
 
 
20The parties to the dispute settlement procedure shall be limited to the member countries that par-
ticipate as a party or a third party.  
21In other words, the GATT/WTO elicits that it is not a legal system governing the relations between 
the 1947 GATT or the member states of WTO (1994 GATT) and the nationals of such member states 
or contracting states, saying “The GATT/ WTO did not create a new legal order that the parties in-
volved in contracting parties or members and their nationals”. 
22The preamble of WTO Agreement is as follows, “Members recognize that their relations are in the 
field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with raising standards of living and en-
suring full employment and a steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand and ex-
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well-meaning that discretionary accepting of pleading documents from a 
non-solicited third-party without the express legal ground does not contradict 
the principle of confidentiality among the AB, party and third party whom DSU 
seeks to protect. In addition, we need to be aware that, in the case of litigation 
proceedings, the adversary system on party autonomy is not absolute and largely 
being revised even in the domestic legal system. It is also true that the ultimate 
objective of dispute settlement procedure is to satisfy the third parties having a 
conflict of interest with immediate parties in dispute as well as to perform the 
abstract control of WTO norms. Hence, it is not reasonable to emphasize the 
principle of adversary system without exception (Howse, 2003). In the course of 
dispute settlement, the parties acknowledge the AB power to discretion in se-
lecting the parties and third parties. Furthermore, with respect to the procedural 
reality and goals—i.e. more efficient discovery of the substantive truth and ob-
jective normative control as well as general policy of non-disclosure against the 
party’s interest, it is not unreasonable to support the practice of Amicus Curiae 
as legitimate in the AB procedure. This is particularly so in consideration of 
current panel and AB practice that legitimately deviates from or can render an 
opinion irrespective of the counts of action, issues and arguments raised by the 
parties.  
Fourth, in practice, the AB judges may use a subordinate external method 
through reference materials to obtain legal advice or assistance. According to the 
DSU, AB judges are advised to be constantly concerned with the proceedings of 
WTO dispute settlement23. In addition, the ICJ statute deemed the legal opinion 
of renowned scholars as a source of international law so that it seems permissible 
for the AB judges to seek legal advice or assistance. In fact, the precedent exists 
that the AB had taken into account the reference studies of legal scholars for the 
resolution of cases. In such cases, it is not only the exception of adversary sys-
tem, but also the parties are often unaware of such facts. In this context, the 
scope of acceptance for the references by outsiders needs to be expanded further, 
which can supplement judges’ prejudice and ignorance with sufficient legal 
counsel (2003). 
Fifth, the existing theories of comparative law require that the AB has discre-
tion in accepting these reference materials. In the United States, the decision of 
the Supreme Court is legally binding the arbitration tribunals or state courts, 
which supports the practice that a legal counsel to the AB judge is highly essen-
tial. The International Court of Justice as well as various special international 
tribunals, e.g. the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights accept these reference 
 
 
23DSU 17.3 states, “the Appellate Body shall consist of persons recognized internationally as recog-
nized experts in the substantive matters of law, international trade and agreements. The Appellate 
Body shall be independent from the Governments of the Member States and shall be constituted so 
as to represent the Member States in a satisfactory manner. The appellate judge shall always be 
available to work at all times upon request and shall always pay attention to and assist with the 
trends of the Parties on matters of dispute and the relevant measures of the WTO. And it cannot be 
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materials in order to provide legal counsel to the judges for resolving matters. In 
other words, the European Court of Human Rights recognizes the right to enact 
the rules of procedure in accordance with the European Convention on Human 
Rights24, as similar to that of the AB, and has already received such reference 
material prior to the legislation of the right to enact. Such powers have been 
customarily recognized and practiced by the inter-American court without an 
express legal ground, and the United States Supreme Court has the same expe-
rience25. The right to receive such reference data has traditionally been wel-
comed in the Anglo-American tradition, where the principles regarding the au-
tonomy of parties are more thorough than the laws of continental states (2003). 
As per the continental tradition, since the courts of continental law are more in-
clusive and inquisitive, it seems that the adoption of such a system was not ne-
cessary. Supporting the acceptance of these reference materials is thought to 
consist with the judicial nature of appellate body and denying them is contrary 
to the intention of establishing the WTO that purported to strengthen the judi-
cial character of AB or rule of law basis resolution of trade disputes between 
countries. I argue that it is reasonable to see it positively. Otherwise, it is nothing 
but to unconsciously follow the arbitration legacy of tending to a strict focus on 
the parties. It is also difficult to see the AB as a professional throne or adminis-
trative potent even if it turns a little inquisitive, and the view is thought to cohere 
with the new enhanced judicial character of GATT system or the ideology of 
WTO as strengthening predictability and legal stability. 
6. Between the Appellate Body and Ministerial Hierarchy 
As stated above, the AB’s authority to interpret covered agreements is not final. 
Under the WTO laws, the ministerial conference or general secretary exclusively 
exercises the power to approve treaty interpretation finally. Furthermore, in cer-
tain cases, the WTO rules and power of treaty interpretation may be excluded in 
principle under the agreements. The fact that the AB does not have a final au-
thority to interpret the agreements is important in establishing the common rule 
of law that the WTO pursues to achieve in the end, which requires a political 
sense of the judge. Let’s take a look at two precedents. In the case of the Balance 
of Payments in India, the issue arose whether the government’s measures to de-
fend the balance of payments for the government of India violated by GATT 
provisions. As a threshold issue, the AB needed to decide whether the case be-
longed to any exclusive jurisdiction of the WTO committee on balance of pay-
ments (hereinafter referred to as CBP) or secretary general. The question of 
whether the trade organization’s dispute settlement mechanism can coexist as a 
valid jurisdiction is emerging as an issue. The panel denied the claim of Indian 
 
 
24Article 55 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
25In Webster, the court accepted the reference materials of government pointing out the unfairness 
of Wade. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410 
(1989). In cases where the state power arises as an issue in the judicial process, the US government 




DOI: 10.4236/blr.2020.114050 844 Beijing Law Review 
 
government under 1994 GATT26, which claimed that the committee and the 
secretary-general had been given exclusive jurisdiction over violations. It con-
cluded that WTO did not exclude the jurisdiction of dispute settlement body. In 
the appellate review on appeal from India, the AB elucidated that DSU should 
grant the dispute settlement body a general jurisdiction over the dispute con-
cerning the breach of covered agreements27 and explicitly stated the absence of 
jurisdiction in Annex 228. It furthered that the Annex 2 needed to read as li-
mited. Therefore, the fact that domestic measures to defend the balance of pay-
ments deficits for developing countries are directly under the GATT clause that 
should be adjudicated by the member states (i.e. the balance of payments com-
mittee and the general secretary) does not compel a conclusion that it cannot be 
judged by the AB. As a counter, the government of India argued that the precedent 
of GATT was binding on the issue of jurisdiction, and that the member states 
possessed the exclusive right to decide on jurisdictional challenge. In response, 
the AB rejected that the GATT precedent relied on by India, as read in comport 
with the understanding on balance of payments, was reversed by the Uruguay 
Round and 1994 GATT. The government of India further stated that the under-
standing on the balance of payments would be absorbed into the dispute settle-
ment procedure set forth in DSU only for the “application” of domestic meas-
ures to defend the balance of payments deficit. According to this statement, the 
issue of “substantive or abstract legality” concerning domestic measures still 
needs to be argued or decided by all member states that the political institutions 
of WTO should hear. However, the AB addressed an appellant’s focus on “ap-
plication” of the said clause in other context meaning that if the relevant domes-
tic laws and ordinances are subject to the dispute settlement body’s process, the 
compulsory clause can be recommended to abolish only if it violates the covered 
agreements. On the basis of compulsory and discretionary rules, the AB further 
elicited that statutory provisions amenable to implement on discretionary basis 
merely confirm the traditional GATT principle, in which they are subject to ad-
judication only if they are “effectively applied”. On this account, the DSB can 
exercise its jurisdiction, whether it is “application” or “statutory provision”. This 
attitude of AB, in fact, seems a rightful conclusion as a treaty interpreter and it is 
reasonable in terms of constructive interpretation of DSU, an important agree-
ment of WTO, which clearly defines the meaning of provisions related to 1947 
GATT. 
Although the complainant’s interpretation of appellate mechanism poses a 
complex problem, it should be seen as justifiable that the appellate body can ex-
 
 
26In terms of the 1994 GATT XVIII: B, the domestic balance of payments related to trade in goods 
shall be reviewed by the balance of payments committee and the general secretary. 
27DSU explains the procedures for the settlement of disputes shall be conducted in accordance with 
the WTO Agreement and DSU. It governs to settle disputes concerning the rights and obligations of 
parties that are alleged to conflict-individually or as multiple-with the covered agreements. DSU 1.1. 
28Annex 2 enumerates nine cases of special dispute settlement procedures, including the special dis-
pute resolution clause within eight agreements or plurality agreements, for instance, the Sanitary 
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ercise judicial power over the “substantive legitimacy” of the India’s balance of 
payments policy as well as “application”. The rationale is on several grounds. 
First, the AB has a primary responsibility to clarify the relationship between 
DSU—that generally sets out the dispute settlement procedure for covered 
agreements—and the special procedure for resolving the dispute of covered 
agreements. The system stipulated that the main purpose was to give legal stabil-
ity and predictability to multilateral trading system29, and although the phrase 
“application” was used in legal terms, the argument of India was not plausible to 
find that it consisted with the laws of DSU to override the GATT Principles. This 
was because, according to the opinion of AB, the argument is simply grounded 
on reading of annotation, but asserts to contradict a more important main text 
of provision. Therefore, the AB found it least persuasive or hard to sustain to 
view that provisions spelled out for general jurisdictions would be excluded and 
not apply to the domestic measures infringing with the benefit and interest of 
member states. It unduly restrains the jurisdiction of DSU and should be unfair 
in terms of equity among the states.  
The government of India also argued that it was unfair to exercise the juris-
diction given a constructive and balanced understanding over multiple source of 
WTO laws, which was rejected by the AB. There is a criticism for the decision of 
rejection (Roessler, 2000). To put, although the exercise of judicial power by AB 
does not in any way exclude the authority of WTO committee to adjudicate on 
the balance of payments issues, it can actually nullify it. In other words, the deci-
sion of CBP is ineffective since it is, in nature, requiring the unanimity of mem-
ber states while the appeal mechanism by a small number of judges is more ef-
fective, so that the CBP can be rendered impotent as a matter of WTO practice. 
A situation, in which the AB decision actually would be compatible with the in-
tent of one prevailing state and same of value with the consensus of CBP, can 
occur. This is a situation where the WTO stands on international agreement, 
and therefore it is not desirable from a point of balanced perspective. There also 
is a concern that the GATT regime may reproduce the problem of conflict be-
tween political and judicial. The scholars critical of AB findings on this regard 
argue that it is necessary to defend a new WTO system, which was envisaged as 
congruent with the establishment of rule of law and state sovereignty, such as the 
introduction of the reverse consensus system while respecting the decisions of 
political institutions. This view emphasizes that the balance of payments prob-
lem is traditionally a matter of political character, not susceptible of the dispute 
settlement body whose mission is to interpret the covered agreements. However, 
the counterargument to these critical views may be built in that it is, in fact, 
nothing but a principle to be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna conven-
tion on the law of treaties requiring the resolution of dispute settlement bodies 
to defer to the decision of political authorities30. The scholars to support AB find-
 
 
29The text of DSU 3.2 is as follows: “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element 
in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system …” 
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ings, therefore, loomed to posit that interpretation of treaty clauses generally fall 
within the adjudicatory body of organizations as referred to the practice of in-
ternational customary law. They safely refute the criticism of AB findings on the 
ground that treaty interpretation is an original role of the dispute settlement 
body. In their viewpoint, because a narrow reading resulted in the limited role of 
dispute settlement mechanism is unacceptable in view of the general jurisdiction 
provision under the DSU and active judicial control over trade. On this ground, 
AB’s finding is deemed precisely fine that it was a legitimate forum to hear a case 
through the assistance of many UN agencies including the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF).  
Another question is whether the AB, an adjudicatory agency of WTO, can de-
termine for itself the existence of legal jurisdiction over the balance of payments 
issue. The state parties (the United States and India) did not raise a preliminary 
objection “no competent jurisdiction” on the balance of payments, which would 
greatly enhance the role of DSB as catalyzed with the reverse consensus system 
proving that the dispute settlement mechanism would develop into a role similar 
to that of other international organizations. In addition, the finding would con-
vince that the dispute settlement mechanism can be regarded as strengthening a 
breakthrough between the old GATT and new WTO system. In particular, it is 
significant that the United States, a leading WTO member, had not raised such a 
plea.  
Another example of the inter-institutional equilibrium dilemma is the Turkish 
Textiles case (WT/DS34/AB/R, 1999), in which the Turkish government’s im-
port restrictions on joining the EU’s customs union became a subject of adjudi-
cation31. The GATT permits the creation of customs unions or free trade zones 
under certain conditions, one of which requires not to violate the obligations of 
covered agreements as provided for in other GATT provisions. This requirement 
needs to be respected when establishing the customs union or free trade zone. 
To be precise, the obligation to abide by non-discriminatory principle as stipu-
lated by the GATT32 is urgently important to obey even after creating the cus-
toms union. This means that exemption from the duties of member in relation 
to the creation of customs union shall only be made of GATT obligations con-
trary to the nature of customs union. Thus, obligations as treaty countries in 
general are not exempted. Similar to the previous case, the Turkish Textiles also 
stipulated that the GATT or member states should review the suggestion of cus-
toms union and recommend on whether it is contrary to the requirements of 
GATT. Even if it does not meet the requirements strictly, the establishment of cus-
toms union or free trade zone can be legitimated with the consent of three-fourths 




31See GATT XXIV. 
32GATT I. 
33GATT XXIV: 7. 
34According to the Understanding on Article XXIV agreed in the Uruguay Round, at least the re-




DOI: 10.4236/blr.2020.114050 847 Beijing Law Review 
 
In any case, with respect to the creation of customs union or free trade zone, 
WTO laws give the right of review to the council on trade of goods35 and con-
currently recognize the jurisdiction of dispute settlement body. In this respect, 
the panel avoided judging the issue of jurisdiction for the dispute settlement 
body, arguing that it had nothing to do with the creation of customs union and, 
consequently, did not need to make judgments about the existence of jurisdic-
tion as a matter of judicial economy. In appellate review, the AB reiterated as 
dictum that the jurisdictional disagreement should be resolved by referring to 
the above precedent on the balance of payments case. And it is doubted to con-
clude, according to the opinion of AB, that it is not related with the creation of 
customs union without reviewing whether the import restriction in question 
meets the requirements for establishing it. In considering the appropriateness of 
decision, the following three situations may be assumed; 1) if the creation of 
customs union or free trade zone is granted by the members 2) if it is denied 3) if 
the member states still did not express its views through the political institutions, 
and so on. In former two cases, it is not possible for the AB to exercise its com-
petence of jurisdiction, which should be impermissible in light of the balance of 
instruments or practices of the parties to the Vienna convention on the law of 
treaty. Then the final outcome should be accorded to the decision of political 
authorities and the AB needs to defer. However, if the appellate body is not able 
to exercise judicial power in cases where there is no decision yet by the political 
organ, the state party that had violated the GATT or other covered agreements 
may continue to use such legal void to maintain its violation. The unreasonable 
inconvenience arises in which the parties damaged with the benefit and interest 
under covered agreements cannot take any measures to defend their rights. On 
the contrary, the parties that the domestic measures are is in conformity with the 
requirements and the creation of customs union is urgent to their benefit and 
interest can be injured because of the legal void.  
In this situation, we need to be aware that, even if the appellate body exercises 
judicial authority, it does not mean to exclude the right of review by political in-
stitutions. Then, the AB findings and recommendations may result in conflict 
with the decisions of political institutions in the future. Assume if the domestic 
measures in question violate the covered agreements of GATT but is decided to 
be legal under the special provisions on customs union while the political insti-
tutions decide in the future not to do so. In this hypothetical case, it would be 
certain that the complaint state shall ask AB to retry. On the contrary, if the AB 
determines inconsistency with the customs union requirement and the political 
body has made a decision as opposite, the defeated party shall restore domestic 
action already found to breach the covered agreements and the prevailing party 
which is dissatisfied with the decision of political organ shall demand a reconsi-
deration. In the review process on reconsideration, the AB, arguably a dispute 
resolution body in judicial character, seemingly would be more appropriate to 
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uphold the decision of political organ, and therefore the creation of customs un-
ion shall be considered possible and as legitimate finally. These two hypothetical 
situations show that the relationship between the AB and political institutions is 
complex. As noted below, the AB is systematically different from domestic 
courts. Because of its nature supported by the international covenant among so-
vereign states, it is influenced by the complex variables in defining the scope of 
its own authority. The potential problems also are not least, such as efficiency of 
the remedy, possibility of faithfully implementing the recommendation, check 
and balance among the intramural organs, as well as the nature of issue or possi-
ble conflict with political institutions. However, considering the reality of new 
WTO system, the possibility that the exercise of active jurisdiction over dispute 
settlement mechanisms will lead to opposition by political institutions seems to 
be unlikely. This leads to justify our suggestion that it is necessary to exercise ac-
tive judicial power in view of strengthening the rule of law. 
7. Judicial Activism of WTO Appellate Body 
It is a well-known fact that there has been an ideological conflict between judi-
cial activism and judicial passivism concerning the rule of law or the role of ju-
diciary. As we know, the role of judiciary as an agent of divine monarchy and 
one bureau for the absolute king has been an axis supporting the emergence of 
democracy based on the electoral system and separation of powers advanced by 
John Locke and Montesquieu. The independence war and French revolution are 
regarded as historical events that have made a great contribution to the devel-
opment of democracy. The judiciary has played a major role in defending free-
dom and justice and maintaining the unity of nation, as US history proves. It is 
no exaggeration to say that the judiciary has been a key actor with the power to 
judicially control the legislative and executive branches. The judicial branch had 
also stood at the center of government that formulated crucial value of nation 
through the interpretation of federal constitution. However, it has always been 
questioned how the judiciary of most countries, as well as the United States, will 
play its part within the conflict of politics and law.  
A chaos of American society surrounding the servitude system, confrontation 
between president Roosevelt and supreme court, as well as social reform legisla-
tion in the early 20th century all would be illustrated as a state of repression for 
social progress or conservatism among the struggle involving politics and law 
(Keller, 1990). Regarding the role of judiciary, well-meaning scholars and pun-
dits emphasize judicial activism. International traders and interest groups are 
also demanding more active judicial intervention of the appellate body. Along 
the discourse on judicial activism and passivism, we are able to find the under-
lying concern of values neutral as they are. In this aspect, judicial activism for 
conservative society is not unreasonable in logic and theory. In most cases, 
however, judicial activism usually calls upon a combination of social ideology 
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character among the three branches of government, which basically triggers the 
relief of individual rights on case or controversies. If the legislative power is an 
abstract act of power, then the judicial power coheres with its passive nature to 
hear cases or controversies initiated by disputed parties. Therefore, it can be 
closer to individual people than other two brother branches, and social progress 
can be achieved through adjudicating on historical or socially significant events 
on clamor. On the other hand, judicial power delivers a specific justice of ab-
stract value enacted by legislature as similar to the executive power, but its adju-
dication is ultimate in accordance with the principle of finality for judicial au-
thority. In this regard, the judiciary could be easy to have a tendency to be con-
servative, and the principle of coherence and precedent would be a dominant 
value of practice (Guerin, 2005).  
Judicial activism must be understood in these limitations so that it is difficult 
to accept judicial activism as an assertion in the sense that can easily be achieved 
as proposed by lay writers or general commentators. Our reality is that it only 
can be approached in any most plausible or effective way among the conflict of 
values and calibrations, given enactment and court precedents. It has to do with 
the ideology concerning the rule of law in pursuit of legal stability and predicta-
bility. Every citizen has the right to freedom and justice, and he may doubt, “the 
citizens who are involved in the case and adjudged, may deprave why it was so in 
the past, but why it is different today”. The role of court is nothing but to re-
spond with this kind of inconsistency and social injustice that has an obligation 
to explain it properly. In the condition of society as extreme or unsustainable 
where legal stability and predictability are not guaranteed, incapacity and private 
retaliation would be prevalent and the actor could not make any rational deci-
sion. The notion of judicial activism would be historically valid if understood 
with respect to the judicial system of United States. In fact, the judiciary actively 
exercised its power or constitutional competence in the course of developing the 
unity of nation under federalism on the cause of judicial activism, thus subju-
gating the state government while forming and developing the national values. 
In the same way, it is in common with the political value of social progress and 
transformation to humanity or emancipation.  
If we talk about judicial activism in the context of international law, we need 
to begin with the famous Lotus case. In other words, the ICJ in that case declared 
the important principle influential over subsequent case laws that the state shall 
exercise its sovereignty freely and without abridgement unless a specific obliga-
tion is imposed on it (P.C.I.J Reports, 1927). In the absence of a specific obliga-
tion, the ruling implied that the international adjudicators could check the na-
tion as a subject of international law by only means of positive interpretation to 
impose certain duties. At this time, there could be a room for conflict between 
the value that the state should defend and the judicial value of judges serving in-
ternational organizations. For instance, how to resolve a dispute filed with the 
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among the authority of state actors involved with the newly emerging health and 
environmental laws and trade controversies. Is it reasonable for the AB judges to 
correct domestic health policies? Judicial activists will, of course, emphasize the ac-
tive role of judges for the advancement of society. At this time, however, the judges, 
as mentioned above, have an obligation to exercise their jurisdictional competence 
while accepting the complexity of values underlying the rule of law ideal. It is in 
conformity with the revolutionary ideology to transform a long-standing trade or-
ganization in order to idealize to secure the rule of law within the real trade are-
na. If it is influenced by political arguments and restrained to its passive tradi-
tion, the ideology of rule of law in the international trade administration would 
come far vitiated to arouse a public dissent or criticism. Since the subject of 
WTO covers the economy and trade, the corresponding discourse on rule of law 
raises an international focus of attention as dissimilar with the sensitive areas of 
international politics, human rights or criminal law. This means that, pertaining 
to the trade jurisdiction, we can have an ample opportunity to experiment the 
rule of law framework in the WTO and, under the consensus of global com-
mons, we even may look forward to the prospect of political unification of the 
international society in the future. 
Then we can see that there are several conditions predicated on judicial activ-
ism with respect to the rule of law.  
First, judicial activism is to expect the active and political role of judicial au-
thorities, and on the other hand, there is a restriction that it cannot go beyond 
the interpretation and verification of recognized legal norms due to the inherent 
limitations of judicial power (Kim, 2014). This means that the state actors sub-
ject to jurisdiction should be provided with legal stability and predictability and 
the panel or AB should provide certain judicial standards in accordance with the 
principle of stare decisis (Guerin, 2005). History shows that the precedents ac-
cumulated through adjudication on cases or controversies play a major role in 
rationalizing society, and the kind of political sense like a Machiavelli could be 
desired qualities of judges in a usually complex situation. The importance of 
precedent is common to both legal traditions across two continents. The final 
authority to interpret constitution in relation to judicial activism has an impor-
tant meaning in the modern government system. The judge can identify and 
educate more basic national values through the constitutional interpretation, so 
that the area in which judicial activism functions can be broadened. Judge-made 
law is made up of these complex circumstances, and especially in the American 
constitutionalism, the trust and respect of judiciary is relatively strong because 
of the legal culture formed by the principle of precedent (2005).  
Second, the above conditions are given to the ordinary domestic judicial sys-
tem. In terms of international judiciary, judicial activism is given more complex 
circumstances. Examples of WTO dispute settlement bodies are: 1) the legal sys-
tem constituted by WTO Agreement and many related agreements is essentially 
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ference composed of ministers from the respective countries, and the decisions 
of panel or appellate body formally take a form of recommendation-not judg-
ment or order, hence, nuanced neither coerced nor forcefully enforced-for the 
implementation of certain matters; 3) it shall have effect when it is finally adopted 
by the DSB, i.e. organization of political nature. In other words, the interbranch 
subtlety and balance is not secured according to the principle of separation of 
powers as distinct from domestic ruling structure, in which the panel or appel-
late body merely assists with the character of political supremacy as a judicial 
counsel. It is in contrast that most enforcement agencies of domestic law strictly 
preserve the character of constitutional power, such as neither being able to give 
an advisory opinion nor exercising jurisdiction when the effective remedy of an 
individual’s rights is impossible—as seen in moot case principle, for instance. 
Third, the WTO Agreement is neither detailed nor sufficiently intricate as dis-
tinct from national laws that it is often difficult to find a clear legal ground to 
discern what the judge can and cannot do. For various reasons, such as legisla-
tive deficiency, the WTO can be regarded as an interdisciplinary room between 
the civil and common law traditions or the nurturing organization to subsidize 
major WTO members including the United States and European Union. In this 
case, the panel or AB judges must be Machiavellian in order to secure the rule of 
law in the trade arena, which are circumstances far worse than the domestic ju-
diciary. If the United States and European Union contend with excessive judicial 
activism by proposing national interests, many difficulties can arise even if they 
forbear from going to ground zero by renouncing a foundational agreement. 
Although WTO agreements are relatively legal and has a scope of leeway ame-
nable to legislative supplementation by the judges, there may be a problem of 
self-ethics caused by less on law and more on arbitration or ignorance of law on 
judicial populism. Furthermore, even if adjudication is reasonable and shrewd to 
wisely resolve the trade controversies, it remains possible that the superpowers 
are implicit to pressure. With the establishment of GATT in 1947, the interna-
tional administration on trade issues had begun their business. Even under the 
old GATT, there had been dispute settlement procedures such as panels, but the 
creation of WTO in 1995 is said to revolutionize them in the direction of 
strengthening the judicial character. Similar to the new constitutional court of 
South Korea and Supreme Court of United States, there have been compiled of 
many precedents under the WTO system since 1995, but this is never compara-
ble to the evolution and accumulation of precedents within the advanced em-
pires of law, for example, the United States. In sum, WTO judges are fated to 
face the challenge of finding a role as a wise ruler in trade amongst the possibly 
legal, cultural or diplomatic assault of major members, i.e. United States or EU, 
as well as with the surrounding political pressure. As regards judicial activism 
under the WTO, the judiciary sets as a starting point the principles of interna-
tional law that, if its obligations under international law are not clear, it should 
not impose obligations restricting national sovereignty and respect the principle 
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required that judges need to go beyond a simple fill-in-the-blank dimension to 
determine the value and increase a protection through judge-made law (Beilin, 
2003). Even if he or she has a leeway since no obligation is expressly specified in 
a given agreement, it is more difficult to draw the obligation and to limit nation-
al sovereignty or the act of government than domestic judicial authorities be-
cause the international organization has a unique political personality. For the 
sake of argument, I like to highlight that there is a similar aspect to the role of 
federal courts under federalism in the legal history. For the past, we know that 
the legal form of nation once had been similar to that of EU as weak or vulnera-
ble, in which the Supreme Court is comparable to the European Court of Justice 
in terms of its role for integration and common values. Under the circums-
tances, judicial activism of the Supreme Court was required to play a central 
role. The lesson of history convinces that it is a conundrum as a matter of prac-
tice or concerning the extent of judicial activism, whether the AB needs to inter-
vene with the matters that the interest of domestic governments is sharply relat-
ing to trade principles, for instance, health and environmental policies.  
8. Conclusion  
While hoping to expect more research in the future, I have examined a part of 
problems entangled with judicial activism of the WTO dispute settlement body 
as aided by the lessons of history or comparative law as well as precedents. The 
WTO is ambitiously moving forward to the rule of law principle within the in-
ternational trade arena as verified through new DSU and its decadal practice. 
However, the given circumstances are throwing a very long-lasting task. Unlike 
the old GATT system, it should be able to guarantee legal stability and predicta-
bility for the relevant actors in order to have a more systematic and effective 
judicial control. Their responsibility is to play an active role for the evolution 
and progress of international society. We believe that there should be constant 
efforts to establish a reliable judicial system to overcome the remains of conven-
tional arbitration procedure. Unless a regime of case law is intricated in which 
lawmakers of the civil or common law traditions can be persuaded, it is unlikely 
or hard to refute the malaise or private retaliation of superpowers and other 
members. A solution cannot be achieved by legislative efforts alone. Further-
more, under the WTO governance, it is more cumbersome to rely on legislative 
solutions than in the domestic case. Therefore, I believe that it seems to be the 
most efficient way to have an enriched, well-refined and intricate system of pre-
cedents comparable to the US and concerning the rule of stare decisis. We see it 
regrettable that it is confined to the economic domain; however, Machiavelli’s 
wisdom and Kantian idealism hopefully can be expected of WTO panels and AB 
judges. 
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